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I. INTRODUCTION
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if... the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.1
Joel Friedman had a slow growing tumor on his thoracic spine.
Unfortunately, his doctors negligently failed to diagnose or treat it.2
Joel then married his wife, Jihane, with whom he initially had a ful-
filling physical relationship.! As his illness progressed, however, Joel
began experiencing erectile dysfunction.' Ultimately, he became com-
pletely impotent.5 When later testing disclosed Joel's undiagnosed tu-
mor, the Friedmans became aware of their cause of action for medical
malpractice.6
Fortunately, our legal system provides some redress to Joel.
The discovery rule7 protects his claim from the statute of limitations.8
Joel, however, is not the only victim in this case. His wife, Jihane, has
also suffered and will continue to face a significant loss of consortium
due to the malpractice of her husband's physicians
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187
(1952).
2. See Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1238 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See Sandra Conroy, The Delayed Discovery Rule and Roe v. Archdiocese, 13 LAW &
INEQ. J. 253, 260 (1995) (noting that equitable exceptions have been established by courts to
avoid strict statutes of limitations); Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery
Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (1982)
(explaining that injuries that do not occur immediately often bypass traditional statutes of limi-
tations in many jurisdictions).
9. See Friedman, 718 A.2d at 1238.
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Unlike Joel, Jihane does not have a cause of action against the
physicians in a majority of courts today."0 As a rule, courts hold that
marriage at the time of injury is a prerequisite for bringing a loss of
consortium claim." Although a physically injured victim is able to em-
ploy the discovery rule to bring the underlying claim of malpractice,
most jurisdictions do not allow the deprived spouse' to use the discov-
ery rule to circumvent the marriage requirement in bringing a loss of
consortium claim. 3 A growing minority of courts, however, allows the
deprived spouse to use the discovery rule when the physically injured
spouse's injuries have manifested only after the marriage."'
Two main factors have brought this issue before the courts in
the last ten years. First, toxic tort litigation has become more frequent
in recent years.' The latency period 6 for injuries caused by toxic sub-
stances can range from a few years to more than one generation. A
10. See Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 919 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (recognizing that the
majority of courts would not allow loss of consortium damages stemming from a premarital in-
jury). For examples of courts refusing to allow a cause of action based upon a premarital, latent
injury, see Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Iowa 1994) and Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
588 N.E.2d 66, 67-68 (N.Y. 1991).
11. See infranote 68.
12. This Note will refer to the spouse who has suffered physical injury as the "injured
spouse" and will refer to the spouse who brings the loss of consortium claim as the "deprived
spouse."
13. See supra note 10.
14. See Green, 960 P.2d at 919; see also Gregg v. Hay-Adams Hotel, 942 F. Supp. 1, 10
(D.D.C. 1996); Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1051 (D. Mass. 1996); Wiggins v. Equifax
Servs., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 213, 225-26 (D.D.C. 1993); Dodson-Barnette v. Support Sys. Int'l, Inc.,
No. 88-1039, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6407, at *2-3 (D.D.C. May 30, 1989); Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (D. Minn. 1988); Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307, 1315-
16 (D.C. 1985); Morales v. Davis Bros. Constr. Co., 706 So. 2d 1048, 1051 (La. Ct. App. 1998);
Herndon v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 655 So. 2d 678, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Aldredge v.
Whitney, 591 So. 2d 1201, 1204-05 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Gore v. Rains & Block, 473 N.W.2d 813,
817 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Moss v. Pacquing, 455 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Furby
v. Raymark Indus., 397 N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d
92, 99 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1998); Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Pa. 1997); Vazquez v.
Friedberg, 637 A.2d 300, 301 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 A.2d
1067, 1071 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
15. See Kim Marie Covello, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limita-
tions in Latent Injury Litigation: An Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 471, 471 (1983); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 966-67 (1988). Some of the most prominent examples of
toxic tort cases are those involving DES, Agent Orange, and asbestos. See id. at 976.
16. For the purposes of this Note, the "latency period" is the time span after the force caus-
ing injury has been set in motion and before its deleterious effects have manifested.
17. See Green, supra note 15, at 973. For instance, asbestos-related diseases might not
manifest until 15 to 50 years from the time of exposure. See id. Similarly, injuries resulting
from in utero DES exposure often exist for many years without detection; indeed 'DES daugh-
ters" commonly do not discover their injuries until they first attempt to become pregnant. See
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person exposed to a toxic substance may not discover the resulting
injury until after marriage because of these long latency periods. 8
The second factor that has caused plaintiffs to bring loss of
consortium claims before the courts at an ever increasing rate is the
medical and legal acceptance of repressed memory syndrome. Both the
medical community and scholarly writings have convinced courts and
legislatures to acknowledge this phenomenon.19 Repressed memory
syndrome occurs when children respond to horrible traumas by bury-
ing the memories in their subconscious." Since repressed memories
are most commonly linked to childhood sexual abuse,' many victims
have problems functioning sexually after recalling these horrible
memories as adults.' The resulting sexual dysfunction can cause vic-
tims' spouses to suffer a loss of consortium.'
Tracey I. Batt, DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217,
1221 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 45 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that courts will see an increasing number of loss of consortium claims stemming from pre-
marital, latent injuries due to the large amount of asbestos-related litigation); Clark v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 725 F. Supp. 130, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 557 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990), affd, 588 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1991); Green, 960 P.2d at 914.
19. See Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A Call for Limi-
tations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual Abuse Trials, 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1995); see also Gary Hood, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits
Brought by Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 417,
417-18.
20. See Lisa A. Atkins, Remembered Memories... True or False?-Should the Discovery
Rule be Applied to Toll the Statute of Limitations?, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 581, 582 (1995)
(" 'Children struggle not to think trauma-related ideas and not to feel trauma-related feel-
ings.... By not thinking about their trauma, by not talking about it, children try to heal their
wounds and to look 'normal." '") (quoting LENORE TERR, TOO SCARED TO CRY 111 (1990)).
21. See id. at 581-83.
22. See Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1050-51 (D. Mass. 1996); H.R.B. v. J.L.G.,
913 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See generally Lisa Bickel, Note, Tolling the Statute of
Limitations in Actions Brought by Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 33 ARIZ. L. REV.,
427, 429 (1991) (stating that victims of childhood sexual abuse often suffer sexual dysfunction as
adults and an "inability to cope with the role of wife"). Psychologists are unsure how these
memories are revived. See Julie Schwartz Silberg, Memory Repression: Should it Toll the Statu-
tory Limitations Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1589, 1595 (1993).
Usually, an event triggers the release of the repressed memories. See id. at 1595-96. The trig-
gering event can be anything from smelling a particular scent to reading a story about sexual
abuse victims. See id. at 1596.
23. See, e.g., Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at 1051 (discussing the loss of consortium a wife expe-
rienced when her husband recalled long-suppressed memories of childhood sexual abuse); Claus
v. Whyle, 526 N.W.2d 519, 521-23 (Iowa 1994) (noting that a husband could not touch certain
parts of his wife's body or engage in foreplay with her after she remembered episodes of child-
hood sexual abuse). "Revival usually occurs years later, when victims are older and less vulner-
able." Id. Most jurisdictions today hold that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the victim recalls the repressed memories. See Murray, supra note 19, at 477-78.
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This Note advocates the minority position, which applies the
discovery rule to loss of consortium claims stemming from premarital
injuries that remain latent until after marriage. Part II discusses the
development of the discovery rule. Part III examines the evolution of
the loss of consortium cause of action. Part IV discusses the justifica-
tions for the marriage requirement and demonstrates that the justifi-
cations are inappropriate in the latent injury context. Part V explains
why the discovery rule should circumvent the marriage requirement
when the injured spouse's injuries remained latent until after mar-
riage. Part VI examines the reasoning of courts that have refused to
apply the discovery rule to such loss of consortium claims. Finally,
Part VII concludes that loss of consortium damages should be avail-
able in cases of premarital, latent injuries if neither spouse knew or
could have known of the injury at the time of the marriage.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIscoVERY RULE
Statutes of limitations are legislative enactments establishing
time limits within which civil claims must be brought.' After the time
limit has expired, a cause of action is barred regardless of its merits.'
Statutes of limitations serve three purposes.' First, they provide a
defendant with reasonable notice of a claim so that he or she may pre-
serve evidence for a defense." Second, they prevent a defendant from
fearing unlimited future liability for a particular action.' Finally, they
encourage people to efficiently adjudicate their grievances.'
The most significant exception to the statute of limitations is
the discovery rule.' The discovery rule delays application of the stat-
ute of limitations until the claimant discovers or could have reasona-
24. See Conroy, supra note 8, at 260. Early English common law courts did not place any
time limits on a plaintiffs right to bring a tort claim. See Steven L. White, Toward a Time-of-
Discovery Rule for the Statute of Limitations in Latent Injury Cases in New York State, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 113, 116-17 & nn.27-28 (1985). In 1623, the second Limitation Act was
passed, which instituted a statute of limitations for tort actions. See Limitation Act of 1623, Jac.
1, ch. 16. Many Colonial legislatures adopted this act with little alteration. See White, supra, at
117.
25. See Conroy, supra note 8, at 260 (citing Brian D. Gallagher, Damages, Duress, and the
Discovery Rules: The Statutory Right for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 17 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 505, 525 (1993)).
26. See Hood, supra note 19, at 424.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Green, supra note 15, at 976.
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bly discovered the cause of action.3 This rule developed because courts
realized the inherent unfairness of barring a claim when the injury
could not have been discovered until after the statutory period.32
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the discov-
ery rule in Urie v. Thompson.33 In Urie, the plaintiff was diagnosed
with silicosis caused by continuous exposure to silicone dust at his
workplace.' Although the three-year statute of limitations would have
barred the suit, the Court held that the plaintiffs "blameless igno-
rance" should not prevent recovery.3 As one court explained:
Use of the discovery rule eases the unconscionable result to innocent victims who by
exercising even the highest degree of care could not have discovered the cited wrong.
By focusing on discovery as the element which triggers the statute of limitations, the
discovery rule gives those injured adequate time to seek relief on the merits without
undue prejudice to... defendants. 36
Many states were slow to accept the discovery rule after the
Supreme Court's Urie decision.1 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a
number of jurisdictions began to apply the doctrine in medical mal-
practice cases.3 Today, the vast majority of courts and commentators
have endorsed application of the discovery rule in cases involving la-
tent injuries.31 Courts now commonly apply the discovery rule in pro-
31. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 431-32.
32. See Cynthia Alice Feigin, Statutes of Limitations: The Special Problem of DES Suits, 7
AM. J.L. & MED. 91, 96 (1981).
33. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); see also Atkins, supra note 20, at 585.
However, California was an earlier proponent of the discovery rule, recognizing the doctrine as
early as 1920. See Firth v. Richter, 196 P. 277, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920); see also Melissa G.
Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 214 (1984).
34. Urie, 337 U.S. at 165-66.
35. Id. at 170.
36. Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio 1983).
37. Twelve years after Urie, only seven states (California, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas) had adopted the discovery rule. See Teeters v. Cur-
rey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974).
38. See id.; see also JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 602 (9th ed. 1994).
39. See Green, supra note 15, at 977-78.
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fessional malpractice actions," products liability suits,41 toxic tort
claims,42 and recovered memory cases.43
I. EVOLUTION OF THE Loss OF CONSORTIUM CAUSE OF ACTION
The evolution of the loss of consortium tort" reflects societal
and legal changes."' Courts originally conceived of the cause of action
as a master's claim for injury to his servant. The cause of action soon
evolved to include a husband's claim for loss of his wife's household
services. In modern times, courts have recognized a wife's right to
bring a loss of consortium claim and have expanded consortium to in-
clude sexual relations, love, and companionship. With the recognition
of a wife's right to bring a loss of consortium claim, however, came the
requirement that the deprived spouse be married to the injured
spouse at the time of injury.'
A. Historical Background
The loss of consortium concept developed in the early common
law, which recognized a master's cause of action against a tortfeasor
who injured his servant." By 1619, the common law developed a simi-
lar right of action in a husband, allowing him to recover for injuries to
40. See, e.g., Teeters, 518 S.W.2d at 512, 517 (applying the discovery rule to a medical mal-
practice action brought by a woman who delivered a child after undergoing a bilateral tubal
ligation).
41. See, e.g., Harper v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (denying
application of the statute of limitations in an action against DES manufacturers, where plaintiffs
suffered injuries many years after in utero DES exposure).
42. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (re-
fusing to apply the statute of limitations to an action brought by the widow of an asbestos
worker).
43. See, e.g., H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 95-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing a man
who had repressed memories of sexual abuse by a priest to bring a cause of action after the stat-
ute of limitations had lapsed).
44. This Note only considers spousal consortium. Some states have allowed parents and
children to bring loss of consortium claims. See generally Annotation, Child's Right of Action for
Loss of Support, Training, Parental Attention, or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently
Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.4th 549 (1982); Todd R. Symth, Annotation, Parent's Right to Recover
for Loss of Consortium in Connection with Injury to Child, 54 A.L.R. 4th 112 (1987).
45. See Susan Demidovich, Comment, Loss of Consortium: Should Marriage Be Retained as
a Prerequisite?, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 842, 842 (1983); Kris Treu, Comment, Loss of Consortium and
Engaged Couples: The Frustrating Fate of Faithful Fiancees, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 219, 219-20 (1983).
46. This Note will refer to the requirement that a marital relationship exist between the
deprived spouse and injured spouse at the time of injury in order for the deprived spouse to bring
a loss of consortium claim as the "marriage requirement."
47. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at
931 (5th ed. 1984).
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his wife." Although recovery was initially granted for the husband's
loss of domestic services, courts have broadened the concept of consor-
tium to include affection, companionship, and sexual company."
Originally, courts did not recognize a corresponding cause of
action on behalf of an injured husband's wife,' as both substantive
and procedural barriers prevented her recovery. Courts held that the
wife of an injured husband had no cause of action for loss of consor-
tium because the action depended on the master-servant relationship,
and courts did not consider the wife to be entitled to her husband's
services." Additionally, the courts perceived that a husband's recovery
included any damages his wife had suffered because a wife's legal
identity merged into her husband's at marriage, preventing her from
bringing suit in her own name.52 Thus, a wife had to be joined by her
husband in any suit, and her husband would retain any recovery."
The movement for gender equality in the latter half of the
nineteenth century cleared most of the obstacles that prevented
women from suing for loss of consortium.' Married Women's Acts en-
abled women to retain earnings, own property, and bring suit on their
own behalf.' As a result of these Acts, courts began to recognize a
woman's cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from inten-
tional interference with the marital relationship.' Even with this
statutory evolution, however, courts still would not allow a married
woman to bring a loss of consortium claim resulting from a negligent
injury to her husband. ' A husband, however, had long been entitled to
48. See id. (citing Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 83 (1620)).
49. See KEETON, supra note 47, § 125, at 931; see also Wood v. Mobil Chem. Co., 365 N.E.2d
1087, 1096 (1977).
50. See Treu, supra note 45, at 220.
51. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 843-44.
52. See id. at 843-44.
53. See id. This requirement allowed a husband to profit from his own wrongdoing in some
instances. See id. at 844. For example, the wife of an unfaithful husband could sue his mistress
for alienation of affections. Since the husband was entitled to the wife's recovery, he was able to
benefit from his infidelity. Claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation have
subsequently been abolished. See KEETON, supra note 47, § 124, at 930 (recognizing that both
causes of action have been abolished or severely limited in a majority of states).
54. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 844.
55. See id; see also Treu, supra note 45, at 221. Examples of some states' versions of these
acts can be found at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (West 1991); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
65/0.01-22 (West 1999).
56. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 844. This allowed wives to bring suit for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation. See Treu, supra note 45, at 221& n.19. Most states have
since abolished these causes of action. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Husband & Wife § 270
(1995).
57. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 844-45; see also Treu, supra note 45, at 221.
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a legal remedy if a third party interfered, either intentionally or negli-
gently, with his right to a relationship with his wife.'
Finally, in 1950, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia recognized in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co." that a wife
has equal standing to bring a loss of consortium claim based on a neg-
ligent act that injures her husband.' While many state courts initially
hesitated to depart from the settled rule that barred women from
bringing a loss of consortium claim based on negligence,6' the over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions now allow a wife to bring a claim
for loss of consortium whether the claim is based on intentional or
negligent acts.2
B. Consortium and the Marriage Requirement
The Hitaffer decision changed the way courts conceptualized
the loss of consortium tort.' The Hitaffer court rejected the idea that
loss of consortium was based on a loss of spousal services.' Instead,
loss of consortium was held to encompass sexual relations as well as
the love and companionship of a spouse.' The court denounced the
traditional reasons for denying a wife's cause of action and based its
decision on the mutual rights of both husband and wife that arise out
of the marital relationship.' Courts have almost uniformly accepted
this theory of consortium."
58. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 843.
59. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Seven years later, Hitaffer
was overruled in part on a worker's compensation point. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d
220, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The loss of consortium holding, however, was unaffected by this
ruling and remains good law. See id.
60. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 845; see also Treu, supra note 45, at 221. The Su-
preme Court of North Carolina had previously allowed a similar claim. See Hipp. v. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co., 108 S.E. 318, 325 (N.C. 1921). However, a later decision effectively over-
turned this case. See Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 126 S.E. 307, 311-12 (N.C. 1925), over-
ruled by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem'l Hosp., 266 S.E.2d 818, 821 (N.C. 1980). See gener-
ally Demidovich, supra note 45, at 845 n.27.
61. See Demidovich, supra note 45, at 846. Most jurisdictions initially viewed Hitaffer as a
renegade decision in a well-settled area of law. See id. at 846 & n.33 ("Eleven years after Hitaf-
fer was decided, only six states had accepted the court's reasoning.).
62. See id. at 846; see also KEETON, supra note 47, § 125, at 932; 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife
§ 117, at 413-14 (1991).
63. See Treu, supra note 45, at 221; see also Demidovich, supra note 45, at 845.
64. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814; see also Demidovich, supra note 45, at 845; Treu, supra note
45, at 221.
65. The court stated that loss of consortium encompassed the loss of sexual relations, love
and companionship, "all welded into a conceptualistic unity." Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
66. See id.
67. See KEETON, supra note 47, § 125, at 932; see also Wood v. Mobil Chem. Co., 365 N.E.2d
1087, 1096 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693(1) (1981); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 213 (6th ed. 1991); Demidovich, supra note 45, at 221.
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A marital relationship between the parties at the time of injury
has therefore become a universal requirement for a loss of consortium
claim.' Courts have consistently denied recovery to engaged couples'
and unmarried couples living together." The three primary rationales
that courts have offered to justify the marriage requirement are pre-
venting the creation of a cause of action through marriage, assump-
tion of the risk, and limiting tort liability.'
IV. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE MARRIAGE REQUIREMENT IS
NOT APPROPRIATE IN THE LATENT INJURY CONTEXT
Some courts facing loss of consortium claims stemming from
premarital, latent injuries have chosen to mechanically apply the
common law rule requiring marriage at the time of injury.' This ap-
proach excludes recovery for married couples who have suffered a loss
of consortium resulting from a premarital, latent injury.3 Courts have
proposed three justifications for the marriage requirement: (1) the law
should not permit a person to "marry a cause of action"; (2) the risk of
future loss of consortium is assumed at the time of marriage; and (3)
allowing loss of consortium claims arising from premarital injuries
68. See Rockstroh v. A.H. Robins Co., 602 F. Supp. 1259, 1269 (D. Md. 1985); KEETON, su-
pra note 47, at 932. But see Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-88 (D.N.J. 1980),
repudiated by Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141, 1141-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982);
Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1973), repudi-
ated by Rockwell v. Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756, 757-58 (Fayette County, Pa. 1975). Both of
these courts were federal courts applying state law. Subsequent cases in the respective states,
however, concluded that marriage at the time of the accident was a prerequisite for a loss of
consortium claim. See Childers, 444 A.2d at 1141-43; Rockwell, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d at 757-58. See
generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband & Wife § 252 (1995); 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 117, at 413-
14 (1991); Charles Plovanich, Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Consortium for Injury Occurring
Prior to Marriage, 5 A.L.R.4th 300 (1981 & Supp. 1997).
69. See, e.g., Sostock v. Reiss, 415 N.E.2d 1094, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to allow a
person who was engaged to the injured party at the time of accident to recover for loss of consor-
tium); accord Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1980). See generally Treu, supra note 45.
70. See, e.g., Curry v. Carterpillar Tractor Co., 577 F. Supp. 991, 993-94 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (re-
fusing to allow a cohabitant of an injured person to recover for loss of consortium); accord Laws
v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 340 (Iowa 1983). See generally Demidovich, supra note 45; Sonja A.
Soehnel, Annotation, Action for Loss of Consortium Based on Nonmartial Cohabitation, 40
A.L.R.4th 553 (1985).
71. See Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 918 (Wash. 1998) (en banc); see also Stager v.
Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307, 1315-16 (D.C. 1985).
72. See Gross v. Sauer, No. 37 83 58, 1992 WL 205277, at *1-*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 14,
1992); Fullerton v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 660 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("In the
absence of any statutory law on this point, Florida courts are required to follow the common-law
rule.').
73. This requirement also prevents recovery for engaged couples and couples living together
outside of marriage. See Stager, 494 A.2d at 1315-16; Green, 960 P.2d at 918-19.
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would provide for near-unlimited liability for tortfeasors.' These justi-
fications for the marriage requirement are inapposite in the latent
injury context, however, and should not bar recovery for a loss of con-
sortium claim."
A. The Spouse of a Person with a Premarital, Latent Injury Does Not
Marry a Cause of Action
In limiting loss of consortium claims, courts have often de-
clared that injustice would result from allowing someone to "marry a
lawsuit,""6 suggesting that a tortfeasor should not be held liable for a
claim that arises simply because the injured party decides to marry.
In Walsh v. Armstrong World Industries, the plaintiff was exposed to
asbestos in his work environment." At the time of his marriage, the
plaintiff had discovered asbestos-related injuries to his lung, and the
court emphasized that the plaintiffs spouse knew of her husband's
illness and disability before their marriage. 8 The Walsh court refused
to allow a person to create loss of consortium liability by the voluntary
act of marrying a person with manifest injuries."
While the Walsh court properly invoked the rule barring a per-
son from marrying a lawsuit when the plaintiffs injuries were mani-
fest at the time of marriage, if the underlying injury is latent at the
time of marriage, a court cannot logically conclude that a spouse mar-
ried a lawsuit.' In the latent injury context, the spouse's voluntary act
of marriage is to a seemingly uninjured person. Thus, a person whose
spouse bears a latent injury at the time of marriage cannot knowingly
marry a cause of action because neither spouse knew of the injury at
the time of the marriage."
74. See Green, 960 P.2d at 918; see also Stager, 494 A.2d at 1315-16.
75. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
76. Walsh v. Armstrong World Indus., 700 F. Supp. 783, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
77. Id. at 784.
78. See id. at 784-85.
79. See id. at 786.
80. See Green, 960 P.2d at 918. Wagner v. International Harvester Co. is often cited for the
proposition that a spouse should not be able to marry a cause of action. See Wagner v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 455 F. Supp. 168, 169 (D. Minn. 1978). Wagner quoted this proposition
from a Pennsylvania decision, Sartori v. Gradison Auto Bus Co., 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 781 (Wash.
County, Pa. 1967). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule should
apply in the premarital, latent injury context. Since it has decided to apply this exception, it
does not consider marrying a person with a latent injury as marrying a cause of action. See
Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Pa. 1997).
81. Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307, 1316 (D.C. 1985); see also Green, 960 P.2d at 918-
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For example, in Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., a husband
brought a loss of consortium claim after an intrauterine device ("JD")
rendered his wife infertile."2 The IUD had been implanted one year
before their marriage.' When they married, the couple did not know
and could not have known of the damage the IUD caused to the wife's
reproductive system.' The defendant-manufacturer argued that per-
mitting this claim would allow the plaintiff to marry a cause of
action.' The court rejected this argument, however, concluding that
unless the deprived spouse knew or should have known of the consor-
tium-depriving injury at the time of the marriage, then he could not
have "married into" the cause of action.' This result demonstrates
that the "marry a lawsuit' justification for the marriage requirement
is inapposite in the latent injury context.
B. The Deprived Spouse Cannot Assume the Risk of Loss of Consortium
If the Risk Is Unknown at the Time of Marriage
In denying claims for loss of consortium brought by couples en-
gaged at the time of injury, courts have emphasized that the deprived
spouse assumed the risk of loss of consortium arising from any pre-
marital injury.'7 For example, in Sawyer v. Bailey, an engaged couple
was involved in an automobile accident on their way to pick up their
wedding invitations.' The prospective bride suffered severe neck and
back injuries.89 Nevertheless, the couple married a few months later.'
After the marriage, the bridegroom sued for loss of consortium due to
the injuries his wife sustained in the auto accident.91 In denying his
82. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (D. Minn. 1988). IUDs are
contraceptive devices implanted in a woman's uterus. See MARY F. HAWKINS, UNSHIELDED: THE
HUMAN COST OF THE DALKON SHIELD 7 (1997). These devices are made of various materials,
including plastic, steel, and nylon. See 3 J.S. SCHMIDT, ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
AND WORD FINDER 1-167 (1999). Although it is uncertain how IUDs prevent pregnancy, the
device likely causes an irritation that prevents the uterus from accepting an ovum. See id. at I-
167 to 1-168. Some IUDs have been shown to cause pelvic inflammatory disease and perforation
of the uterus, both of which can cause infertility. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK
COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 295 (1992). Moreover, IUDs have caused death
in some instances. See id.
83. See Kociemba, 683 F. Supp. at 1578.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 918 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
88. Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 166 (Me. 1980).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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claim, the Supreme Court of Maine declared that the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk of any possible loss of consortium arising from his
wife's premarital injury when he entered into the marriage. 2
Courts should not reach this conclusion in the latent injury
context, however. Inherent in the assumption of risk defense is the
requirement that the plaintiff have knowledge of the risk and volun-
tarily assume it."' This second justification is absent in cases of pre-
marital, latent injuries, for in those cases the deprived spouse did not
have knowledge of the risk at the time of the marriage.94 A person
cannot voluntarily assume a risk of which he is unaware. 5
For example, in Stager v. Schneider, the defendant-physician
ordered a routine chest x-ray as part of standard preoperative proce-
dures for his patient's bilateral foot problems.9" The x-ray revealed an
increased density in the right lung, which the physician noted in his
report as possibly cancerous. 7 The physician, however, never informed
his patient of this condition. Three months later, the patient
married." A regular physical examination after the marriage revealed
a cancerous tumor on the patient's lung."° Surgery was performed to
remove the upper lobe of her right lung, two of her ribs, and sur-
rounding nerves, muscles, and tissue."'
When the patient sued her physician for the medical malprac-
tice leading to her permanent injury, her husband joined the claim,
seeking loss of consortium damages."2 The court recognized that when
the discovery rule controls the underlying claim, the same rule should
control the loss of consortium claim, and the court thus allowed the
husband's claim." Likewise, in Friedman v. Klazmer, the court al-
lowed a nearly identical claim for similar reasons.' ° These courts have
recognized the principle that a risk cannot be assumed without knowl-
92. See id. at 167 ('When Daniel Sawyer later took Lynn Jackson as his lawful wedded wife,
he took her for better or for worse in her then existing state of health, voluntarily taking unto
himself any marital deprivation that might result from his wife's premarital injury.).
93. See WADE, supra note 38, at 590(1); see also Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307, 1316
(D.C. 1985); Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 918 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
94. See WADE, supra note 38, at 590(1).
95. See id.
96. Stager, 494 A.2d at 1310.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1315.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1309-10.
103. See id. at 1316.
104. See Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1240-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.). For a reci-
tation of the facts of this case, see supra Part I.
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edge of the risk. 5 The courts have thus concluded that a spouse can-
not assume the risk of loss of consortium if neither spouse knew or
had reason to know of any injury at the time of marriage. This conclu-
sion demonstrates that the assumption of risk justification for the
marriage requirement is inapposite in the latent injury context.
C. Allowing This Cause of Action Would Not Create
Unlimited Tort Liability
In determining whether to allow a loss of consortium claim
stemming from premarital, latent injuries, a court first determines
whether the tortfeasor owed the deprived spouse a duty of care."° This
analysis begins by considering the foreseeability of the deprived
spouse's injuries.1" It is foreseeable that a person who suffers a latent
injury will subsequently marry, and equally foreseeable that the in-
jury will affect the couple's relationship."8 Of course, it is also foresee-
able that an injured person would have friends, children, siblings,
105. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated:
The rationale for [the marriage requirement] has been variously stated: a person should
not be permitted to marry a cause of action; one takes a spouse in the then existing state
of health and thus assumes the risk of any deprivation resulting from prior disability; on
social policy grounds, liability at some point must be delimited. We have no hesitance in
expressing our agreement with [these justifications] where the issue is the right to claim
consortium where the tortious conduct and the fact of injury were both known or know-
able prior to marriage. That, however, is not this case.
Stager, 494 A.2d at 1315-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court observed that the
deprived spouse did not know of the wrongful conduct or the fact of injury prior to marriage. See
id. at 1316. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, made a similar observation:
While it is true that one may not marry a cause of action, a more accurate statement is
that one may not "knowingly" marry a cause of action. Stated another way, a spouse may
proceed with a loss of consortium claim where the injury was suffered before marriage, so
long as the injury was not discovered or reasonably discoverable by either spouse until af-
ter marriage . . . . Jihane Friedman is entitled to bring her loss of consortium claim
since neither she nor Joel Friedman knew, or had reason to know, of Joel's premarital
tumor or potential malpractice claim which was not discovered until after their marriage.
Friedman, 718 A.2d at 1240-41.
106. See Laurie J. Barsella, Comment, Negligent Injury to Family Relationships: A Reevalu-
ation of the Logic of Liability, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 794, 806 (1983).
107. See id.
108. See Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 919 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). The Green court stated:
[I] t is surely foreseeable that a future spouse or close relative might suffer loss of consor-
tium damages. The class of potential plaintiffs is therefore quite limited, confined to
those who might some day be in consortium with the injured party. Thus, allowing such
claims does not expose a tortfeasor to unbounded liability.
See also Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 45 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a
loss of consortium claim stemming from a premarital tort is a cause of action that "can be ex-
pected to recur in a significant number of cases").
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cousins, etc., who might also experience a decline in the quality of
their relationship with the injured party."'
Given the potential for unlimited foreseeability and subsequent
unlimited liability, courts have concluded they cannot possibly com-
pensate every foreseeable injury.11 In determining tort liability, courts
are thus careful to draw a line between compensating the injured and
placing undue burdens on tortfeasors.1 Courts have almost uniformly
rejected loss of consortium claims brought by cohabitants or persons
engaged to the injured party at the time of accident. The public pol-
icy of limiting liability is the primary reason courts have given for re-
jecting these claims."' In Tong v. Jocson, for example, the court de-
nied loss of consortium to an engaged party, concluding, "'[N]ot every
loss can be made compensable in money damages, and legal causation
must terminate somewhere.' ,114
In contrast to these cases, loss of consortium claims arising out
of premarital, latent-effect torts do not create unlimited liability. In-
deed, allowing a claim in this situation would not extend loss of con-
sortium beyond the traditional consortium parties-husband and
wife.1 5 A married couple suing for loss of consortium in a case involv-
ing a premarital, latent-effect tort does not expand the traditional
consortium parties because the couple meets the marriage require-
109. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977) (en banc) ("No one
suggests that [brothers, sisters, cousins, in-laws, friends, or colleagues] possess a right of action
for loss of... consortium; all agree that somewhere a line must be drawn.).
110. See id, see also Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (Every injury has
ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is
to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.'); Barsella, supra note 106, at
806 ("While many injuries and losses are foreseeable, not all should be actionable.").
111. See, e.g., Borer, 563 P.2d at 862.
112. See supra notes 69-70. Although a few courts have allowed recovery in these situations,
these cases have been subsequently overruled or repudiated. See Bulloch v. United States, 487
F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (D.N.J. 1980) (holding that a New Jersey court would allow a cohabitant's
claim for loss of consortium), repudiated by Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141, 1141-43 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127, 133-
34 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (allowing a person engaged to the injured party at the time of accident to
recover for loss of consortium), repudiated by Rockwell v. Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756, 757-58
(Fayette County, Pa. 1975); Butcher v. Superior Ct., 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511-12 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that an unmarried cohabitant may state a cause of action for loss of consortium by
showing that the relationship is stable and significant), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582, 590 (Cal. 1988) (in bank).
113. See, e.g., Tong v. Jocson, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Sawyer v. Bailey,
413 A.2d 165, 168 (Me. 1980) ('CLegal causation must terminate somewhere and in the case of
loss of consortium must as a social public policy be limited to the factual status of husband and
wife existing at the time of the occurrence of the tortious conduct.").
114. Tong, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 727 (quoting Suter v. Leonard, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975)).
115. See cases cited supra notes 67-68.
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ment."' Moreover, in these cases only one claim for loss of consortium
can exist-that of the deprived spouse at the time the injury is discov-
ered. This fact precludes loss of consortium claims by other past or
future spouses. In allowing a deprived spouse to recover for loss of
consortium resulting from latent, premarital injuries discovered only
after marriage, a court does not bring unlimited liability upon the tort-
feasor; rather, liability for loss of consortium remains limited to the
traditional consortium parties.117 This conclusion demonstrates that
the policy justification for the marriage requirement is inapposite in
the latent injury context.
V. THE DISCOVERY RULE SHOULD APPLY TO Loss OF CONSORTIUM
CLAIMS STEMMING FROM PREMARITAL, LATENT INJURIES
Courts should apply the discovery rule to loss of consortium
claims arising from premarital, latent injuries for several reasons.
First, application of the discovery rule in these situations does not cir-
cumvent the underlying justifications for the marriage requirement.
Second, failure to apply the discovery rule in these situations produces
inequity, as a spouse suffering loss of consortium in these cases did
not and could not have known of the claim until injuries manifested.
Third, use of the discovery rule in these situations to recognize loss of
consortium claims serves the purpose of encouraging love and com-
panionship between marital partners.
A. The Marriage Requirement Was Not Intended to Prohibit Claims
Stemming from Premarital, Latent Injuries
The reasons for allowing the discovery rule to circumvent the
statute of limitations in latent injury cases also warrant application of
the rule to circumvent the marriage requirement in the case of pre-
marital, latent injuries. Before the discovery rule was applied to the
statute of limitations, latent injury causes of action were unfairly
barred."' One purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage the
efficient adjudication of grievances. 9 In the latent injury context,
however, the statute of limitations did nothing to encourage efficient
116. See Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
117. See Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307, 1316 (D.C. 1985).
118. See Feigin, supra note 32, at 96 ('CThis discovery rule developed out of a recognition of
the unfairness inherent in allowing statutes of limitations to run from the time of the negligent
act, when the injury was not, and could not have been discovered until much later.').
119. See Hood, supra note 19, at 424.
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adjudication given that parties can only bring suit when they know of
their injuries. After courts realized the inequity of applying the stat-
ute of limitations to latent injury claims, they adopted the discovery
rule to rectify the unjust results."
In a similar manner, courts should apply the discovery rule to
loss of consortium claims to prevent the injustice of the marriage re-
quirement. Courts adopted the marriage requirement to prevent
someone from knowingly marrying an injured person and then bring-
ing a cause of action."2 This requirement, like the statute of limita-
tions, was a seventeenth-century conception of tort law,' which failed
to envision the modern concept of latent injuries such as medical mal-
practice, toxic torts, and repressed memory syndrome. When a pre-
marital injury is manifest at the time of marriage, the marriage re-
quirement succeeds in preventing a person from consciously acquiring
a cause of action through marriage; in the latent injury context, how-
ever, a person cannot consciously act to acquire a cause of action. The
mechanical application of the requirement could thus bar claims that
it was not designed to preclude.
B. Principles of Equity Suggest that the Discovery Rule Should
Apply to Loss of Consortium Claims Stemming from
Premarital, Latent Injuries
Denying a deprived spouse a cause of action for torts occurring
before marriage in cases where injuries were latent at the time of
marriage offends principles of equity.' Friedman v. Klazmer illus-
trates this point. In Friedman, both spouses were healthy at the time
of the marriage. 4 Soon after the marriage, however, the husband be-
came completely impotent due to the defendants' negligence." Al-
though his wife entered the marriage believing she would enjoy a life-
time of close companionship with her husband, the quality of their
relationship declined with time because of the defendants'
negligence."
120. See Feigin, supra note 32, at 91, 96.
121. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (D. Minn. 1988) ('The pur-
pose of the general rule is to prevent an individual from making a conscious decision to acquire a
cause of action by marrying an injured party.).
122. See supra Part IlL.
123. See Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); Green v.
A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 919 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
124. Friedman, 718 A.2d at 1238.
125. See id.
126. See id. For a more detailed recitation of the facts of Friedman, see supra Part I.
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For reasons of equity, the injured spouse is allowed use of the
discovery rule to revive the underlying claim; the deprived spouse
should similarly be given the benefit of the discovery rule for loss of
consortium claims."' The spouse who suffered physical injury did not
and could not have known of the injury at the time the statute of limi-
tations lapsed. Likewise, the spouse who suffered a loss of consortium
did not and could not have known of the injury and resulting depriva-
tion at the time of the marriage. Courts have recognized the inequity
of barring the claim of a person whose injury was unknowable before
the statutory period expired and have adopted the discovery rule to
save these claims from the statute of limitations."' Latent, premarital
injuries are similarly unknowable at the time of marriage, and courts
should adopt the discovery rule to prevent the unfairness of barring
the claim of a spouse who has suffered a loss of consortium but had no
way of expecting the loss at the time of marriage. As the Friedman
court explained, "[i]f this court was to mechanically apply the rule that
a party must be married before an injury in order to recover loss of
consortium damages, an inequitable result would occur."'
In Green v. A.P.C., the Supreme Court of Washington also
faced the issue of whether the discovery rule could be used to circum-
vent the marriage requirement and found that equity required its ap-
plication in this context. 3' The plaintiff was a woman exposed to DES
in utero.'3' Almost four years after her marriage, the plaintiff discov-
ered that she had a malformed uterus as a result of her DES
exposure.3 ' This condition resulted in an extremely grueling preg-
nancy.'33 Along with her claim against the DES manufacturers, her
husband made a claim for loss of consortium." The court concluded
that inequity would result from the failure to apply the discovery rule
127. See Green, 960 P.2d at 919.
128. See Feigin, supra note 32, at 91, 96.
129. Friedman, 718 A.2d at 1240.
130. Green, 960 P.2d at 918-19.
131. See id. at 914. Physicians prescribed DES to millions of pregnant women during the
1950s and 1960s for prevention of miscarriage. See Batt, supra note 17, at 1218. This practice
stopped in 1971 after DES was linked to various health problems for both these women and their
children. See id. at 1218, 1221. For "DES daughters" like Kathleen, these problems include a T-
shaped uterus, a hooded cervix, and increased risk of miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy. See id.
at 1221. In utero DES exposure also places adult daughters at a highly increased risk of a rare
but fatal form of cancer. See Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 374 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
132. See Green, 960 P.2d at 914.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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to the loss of consortium claim and thus allowed the husband's
claim. 1
5
C. The History of the Loss of Consortium Cause of Action
Suggests that Claims Should be Allowed in the
Premarital, Latent Injury Context
Since the loss of consortium concept at common law viewed the
wife as a chattel, many commentators believed that gender equality
would abolish the loss of consortium cause of action.136 The tort flour-
ished, however, because it evolved as a protection of the marital rela-
tionship."7 Courts soon viewed the right to the loss of consortium claim
as an outgrowth of the marital contract rather than a principle of
property law.1 38 In a marriage, the spouses receive the legally recog-
nized right to one another's companionship, comfort, and affection.3 '
With this benefit, each spouse assumes duties and responsibilities to
the other."' Thus, the marital relationship became the "touchstone of
the consortium claim."'4
Courts should allow a spouse whose partner manifests an in-
jury that was latent at the time of marriage to bring a loss of consor-
tium claim because the couple has the prerequisite marital relation-
135. See id. at 919 ("[L'oss of consortium damages should be available for a premarital injury
if the injured spouse either does not know or cannot know of the injury.').
136. See WADE, supra note 38, at 1125 n.7.
137. See Kelly M. Martin, Note, Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants'
Relational Interest?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (1985) ("Hitaffer ... stand[s] for the proposi-
tion that the purpose of the cause of action for loss of consortium is to provide protection for the
marital relationship.').
138. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overruled on other
grounds by Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Hitaffer court
explained:
Marriage gives each the same rights .... Each is entitled to the comfort, companionship,
and affection of the other. The rights of the one and obligations of the other spring from
the marriage contract .... Any interference with these rights, whether of the husband or
of the wife, is a violation, not only of natural right, but also of a legal right arising out of
the marriage relation.
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E. 17, 18 (N.Y. 1889)).
139. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 816; Abraham Somer, Consortium, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 334, 335
(1961).
140. See Somer, supra note 139, at 335; see also Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 231 A.2d 514, 521 (Md. Ct. App. 1967) ("[There
is, in a continuing marital relationship, an inseparable mutuality of ties and obligations, of
pleasures, affection and companionship, which makes that relationship a factual entity.'); 55
C.J.S. Marriage § 3, at 551 (1998) ("[Certain rights and duties incident to the relationship come
into being.'). Public policy and the law have long favored marriage as the foundation of our
society. See In re Peterson's Estate, 365 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1961); Tremblay, 390 So. 2d at 818;.
See generally 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 3 (1970).
141. Friedman v. Klazmer, 718 A.2d 1238, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
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ship.14 Spouses in this situation have accepted the burdens and re-
sponsibilities of the marital relationship. In exchange, the state should
protect their right to one another's companionship by honoring their
loss of consortium claims. All of the same justifications for allowing a
spouse to bring a loss of consortium claim' apply equally in the pre-
marital, latent injury context.
VI. COURTS REFUSING TO APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE TO Loss OF
CONSORTIUM CLAIMS STEMMING FROM PREMARITAL, LATENT
INJURIES HAVE EMPLOYED FAULTY REASONING
While significant reasons exist to justify application of the dis-
covery rule to loss of consortium claims based on latent, premarital
injuries, " some courts have still refused use of the discovery rule in
these situations. Courts in New York and Iowa, for example, have con-
sidered the merits of such claims, but have nonetheless concluded that
the discovery rule should not circumvent the marriage requirement.
These courts, however, have used flawed reasoning to reject the appli-
cation of the discovery rule to these cases. The decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals have overlooked statutory authority and mis-
construed the essence of the loss of consortium claim. The Iowa Su-
preme Court has based its decisions on a fundamental misunder-
standing of the discovery rule. Both courts have failed to examine the
countervailing reasons for allowing loss of consortium claims in the
premarital, latent injury context.
A. New York Courts
1. Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co.
The New York Court of Appeals first addressed application of
the discovery rule to loss of consortium claims based on latent, pre-
marital injuries in Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson I11). "' In
142. See id.
143. See Reep v. Commissioner of Dep't of Employment & Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297, 1302
(Mass. 1992) ('The right to recover for loss of consortium promotes the value of family.").
144. See supra Part V.
145. Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson IF'), 588 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1991). Before the Court
of Appeals addressed the issue, two federal courts applying New York law adjudicated similar
cases. In Walsh v. Armstrong World Industries, 700 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the
widow of an asbestos victim sued, inter alia, for the consortium she was deprived of during her
late husband's decline. However, in this case, the deprived spouse knew of her husband's illness
and disability before their marriage. See id. at 785. The defendant argued that the claim should
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Anderson, the plaintiff alleged that her in utero exposure to DES pre-
vented her from giving birth to a healthy child, ultimately causing her
to undergo a radical hysterectomy.'46 Her husband asserted a claim for
loss of consortium."'7 He argued that the general rule requiring mar-
riage at the time of the injury should only apply if the injuries are
manifest at the time of marriage.' 8 The court rejected this claim and
held that the deprived spouse must be married to the physically in-
jured spouse at the time of injury to bring a claim for loss of consor-
tium."9 The court offered only one sentence to explain its holding:
"'Consortium represents the marital partners' interest in the continu-
ance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception, not upon
some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting
latent injuries.' ""'
The Anderson I court's conclusion is faulty for four reasons.
First, the court's statement misinterprets the precedent it relied on-
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co."' The lower appellate court
cited Millington for the proposition that "[c]onsortium represents the
marital partners' interest in the continuance of the marital relation-
ship as it existed at its inception."'52 In actuality, the Millington court
only stated that "consortium ... represents the interest of the injured
party's spouse in the continuance of a healthy and happy marital
life." Thus, the lower court in Anderson I added the "as it existed at
be denied because the plaintiff was not married to the decedent at the time his injury accrued.
See id. at 784. The court agreed, holding that "a spouse may not recover loss of consortium dam-
ages for injury that is manifest at the time of marriage." Id. at 785. The court also noted that
"[a] spouse who married a victim of toxic exposure after exposure, but during the latency period
of the disease, should perhaps be entitled to recovery for loss of consortium." Id.
Less than one year later, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York faced
the very issue about which the Walsh court speculated, a loss of consortium claim arising from a
premarital, latent-effect tort. See Clark v. Eli Lilly & Co., 725 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1989). In
this case, the injured spouse had been exposed in utero to DES. See id. at 131. Her injuries only
manifested after she became married. See id. at 132. In rejecting her husband's claim for loss of
consortium, the court noted, "the courts of New York ... have not focused on the spouses' pre-
marital knowledge. On the contrary ... New York courts have focused solely on whether the
tortious conduct preceded marriage." Id. This pre-Anderson holding relied upon the default
common law rule, which requires marriage at the time of the injury, and failed to explore the
unique situation resulting in the latent injury context.
146. See Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson r, 557 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
147. See id.
148. See Anderson II, 588 N.E.2d at 67.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Anderson I, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 983) (citing Millington v. Southeastern
Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968)).
151. Millington, 239 N.E.2d 897.
152. Anderson I, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
153. Millington, 239 N.E.2d at 900.
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its inception" language."M The original statement of the Millington
court suggests that the court would have been more sympathetic to
loss of consortium actions arising from premarital, latent injuries, due
to the important public policy of protecting healthy and happy marital
relationships.'55
Second, the Anderson I1 court's statement is fundamentally at
odds with the modern understanding of the loss of consortium cause of
action. Consortium does not simply represent the marital partners'
interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at
the marriage's inception, as the court holds. If followed, this reasoning
would create a rule whereby recovery for loss of consortium would not
take into account the amount of consortium the deprived spouse actu-
ally lost. The problem with such a rule can be demonstrated by con-
sidering two couples whose marriages were arranged by their parents.
In the first situation, the husband is injured just one day after meet-
ing his new bride on their wedding day. In the second situation, the
husband's injuries do not manifest until some thirty years after the
marriage, during which time the couple has grown inseparable. Un-
der the rule set out in Anderson I, the loss of consortium claims in
both situations would be valued at the time of the wedding. Even
though the second couple nurtured their relationship for three dec-
ades, the deprived wife in the second situation would receive the same
compensation as the first wife for her loss of consortium claim.
No other court has even contemplated such a superficial valua-
tion. When valuing a loss of consortium claim, courts calculate the
actual damages"s of the deprived spouse by analyzing the quality of
the couple's relationship' as it existed at the time the impaired
spouse initially suffered a loss of consortium."' This method allows a
factfinder to determine the actual consortium the deprived spouse will
154. Compare Anderson 1, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 983, with Millington, 239 N.E.2d at 900.
155. See supra Part V.C.
156. See, e.g., Gosnell v. Dorchester Sch. Dist. No. 2, 389 S.E.2d 865, 866 (S.C. 1990) ("Dam-
ages awarded for loss of consortium are compensatory damages, which are by definition actual
damages.!).
157. See Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 532 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis. 1995) (explaining that the
amount of damages for loss of consortium is dependent on the quality of the couple's relation-
ship); see also Countryman v. County of Winnebago, 481 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (fI. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that evidence that the injured spouse engaged in an extramarital affair is relevant to
the valuation of the deprived spouse's loss of consortium claim).
158. See Kottka v. PPG Indus. Inc., 388 N.W.2d 160, 169 (Wis. 1986) (" 'fflou should consider
the nature, the form, and quality of the relationship that existed between (the spouses) up to the
time of the injury.'") (quoting Wisconsin Jury Instruction 1815); see also Denaux v. United
States, 572 F. Supp. 659, 667 (D.S.C. 1983) (evaluating plaintiffs consortium claim based on the
companionship the couple shared in the "golden years of their lives').
706 [Vol. 53:685
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
have to forego.59 Thus, consortium represents the marital partners'
interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at
the time of the loss of consortium, not at the marriage's inception.
The third reason that the Anderson H court's conclusion is
faulty is that, even assuming the court's premise-that consortium
represents the marital partners' interest in the continuance of the
marital relationship as it existed at the marriage's inception-is cor-
rect, the conclusion that a claim based on premarital, latent injuries is
barred does not follow. The Anderson II court's understanding of con-
sortium does not preclude a claim for loss of consortium based on pre-
marital, latent injuries because when a spouse enters a marriage with
a latent injury, the injury has no effect on the marital relationship at
that time.1" Instead, the couple, despite the latent injury, has a nor-
mal marital relationship at the inception of the marriage because the
premarital injury has not yet manifested. If consortium represents the
continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its beginning,
the deprived spouse in the latent injury context should thus have a
cause of action against the tortfeasor. 6'
Fourth, the court failed to adequately consider applicable
statutory authority. More than five years before the court decided
Anderson I, the New York legislature enacted the discovery rule in
toxic exposure cases."2 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c(2) provides:
[Tihe three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal in-
jury.. . caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of
substances, in any form, upon or within the body ... must be commenced shall be com-
puted from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when
through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered
by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier."
Since the legislature did not define "personal injury" under this sec-
tion, New York's general rules of statutory construction apply.'"
These rules define "personal injury" as an "actionable injury to the
159. The value of the marital relationship increases when a couple's love grows stronger over
the years. Likewise, consortium decreases when spouses experience turmoil in their marriage.
160. For example, exposure to asbestos two years before marriage would probably not affect
the marital relationship at its inception.
161. For example, consider a man who is exposed to asbestos at age 20. Five years later, he
marries. When he is 50, he develops asbestosis from his exposure 30 years earlier. If consortium
is measured at the start of the marriage, then in this case it would be measured at age 25. Since
there were no symptoms interfering with consortium at that time, the wife should have a claim
for loss of consortium based on the quality of the marital relationship when her husband was 25
years old.
162. See Blanco v. AT&T Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1997). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 214-c (McKinney 1999) (passed in 1986).
163. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (emphasis added).
164. See People v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 51 N.E. 312, 313 (N.Y. 1898).
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person either of the plaintiff, or of another."' New York common law
has consistently interpreted this definition to include loss of services
or consortium.1"
In refusing to apply the discovery rule statute to the plaintiffs
loss of consortium claim in Anderson I, the court stated: "'[CPLR 214-
c] was directed at opening up traditional avenues of recovery by re-
moving a procedural barrier that was unreasonable given the nature
of DES injuries. Nothing in the legislation [however] suggests that
the Legislature intended to expand the basis for liability.' )2167 This
holding disregarded the legislature's intent and failed to consider the
policy reasons favoring its application in this case.
The court should have begun its analysis by noting that the
statutory discovery rule applied to loss of consortium claims. The New
York statutory definition of "personal injury" and its common law in-
terpretation necessitate this outcome.' The court should have then
considered competing policy reasons for the statute's application to
loss of consortium claims in the premarital, latent injury context.
Instead, the court dismissed the claim because it did not be-
lieve the statute evidenced an intent to expand liability." This read-
ing is contrary to the legislature's intent and the broad language of
the statute. Since the legislature intended C.P.L.R. 214-c to be a re-
medial measure, the court should interpret it broadly."' In Blanco v.
AT&T Co., the New York Court of Appeals recognized that this maxim
should apply to the discovery rule statute. 7' The court's opinion in
Anderson 1I, however, was a strict application of this remedial statute.
In light of the legislature's intent in adopting the discovery rule, the
New York court should have applied the discovery rule to the plain-
tiffs loss of consortium claim.
165. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 37-a (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).
166. See, e.g., Psoth v. Long Island R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 180, 182 (N.Y. 1927) ("Actions by a fa-
ther for the loss of the services of his child, or a husband for the loss of the services of his wife
have in legal parlance been classed with personal injury cases.'); Augenblick v. Augenblick, 117
N.Y.S. 2d 69, 71-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952) (holding that a husband's loss of consortium claim falls
within the statutory definition of "personal injury).
167. Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson IF), 588 N.E.2d 66, 68 (N.Y. 1991) (alterations in
original) (quoting Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 202 (N.Y. 1991)).
168. See supra Part VI.A.1.
169. See Anderson II, 588 N.E.2d at 68.
170. See Blanco v. AT&T Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1997).
171. See id.
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2. Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
Four years after Anderson I, the New York Court of Appeals
again considered whether a spouse could bring a loss of consortium
claim stemming from a premarital, latent injury. 72 The Second Circuit
certified this issue to the court in Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. ("Consorti ff").'7 The certified question was "whether... a con-
sortium claim based on mesothelioma, occurring after a marriage but
resulting from exposure to asbestos occurring before the marriage, is a
valid claim under New York law."'1 " The New York Court of Appeals
answered that a loss of consortium claim based on latent, premarital
injuries is not recognizable if the injured spouse and deprived spouse
were not married at the time of injury. 5
Although the Consorti It court could have simply cited the
holding in Anderson H and entered judgment for the defendant, the
court cited Anderson ii merely for the following proposition:
Under settled New York law, because consortium represents each marital partner's in-
terest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at the inception of the
marriage, a loss of consortium cause of action by the spouse of an injured person "does
not lie if the alleged tortious conduct and resultant injuries occurred prior to the mar-
riage."! 17
The court failed to recognize that Anderson I had already held that a
spouse could not bring a loss of consortium claim arising from a pre-
marital, latent injury7' Instead, the court acknowledged that most of
the date of injury jurisprudence concerned application of the statute of
limitationsY.18 The court reasoned that "the same considerations apply
in determining the date of injury for purposes of a loss of consortium
claim.' 79 The court proceeded to use the statute of limitations juris-
172. Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. ("Consorti IP), 657 N.E.2d 1301, 1301 (N.Y.
1995).
173. See id.
174. Consorti v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. ("Consorti r), 45 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1995).
In this case, the impaired spouse was exposed to asbestos at his workplace from 1960 to 1970.
Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1301. Six years after the exposure ended, he married. See id. Sixteen
years after he was married, he developed mesothelioma, an incurable form of cancer. See id.
175. See Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1301.
176. See id. For a discussion of Anderson II, see supra Part VI.A.1.
177. See Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson Ir), 588 N.E.2d 66, 68 (N.Y. 1991).
178. See id. at 1302 ('The issue of date of injury in toxic substance exposure cases in New
York courts has most often been presented in the context of the application of the Statute of
Limitations.").
179. Id. The holding that the same accrual rule should apply to a loss of consortium claim as
applies to the underlying claim accords with the decision in Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp.
1018, 1051 (D. Mass. 1996). In Armstrong, a drama teacher sexually abused the plaintiff during
junior high school. See id. at 1028. Seventeen years later, the plaintiff recalled the sexual abuse
when he saw his son in an elementary school play. See id. at 1029; see also supra Part I (dis-
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prudence to determine the time of injury for the loss of consortium
claim."w
The court discussed five cases from the preceding sixty years
that decided when an injury occurs for statute of limitations
purposes. 8' All held that New York adhered to a time of exposure rule,
rather than the discovery rule, for determining when the statute of
limitations started to run.'82 Accordingly, the court held that the expo-
sure rule still determined when a toxic substance injures someone."
Astonishingly, the Consorti II court failed to recognize that the
discovery rule statute had abrogated the cases it relied on almost ten
years earlier. Two years later, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in
Blanco v. AT&T Co. that "CPLR 214-c was enacted to abrogate the
exposure rule which [the court] had formulated and adhered to in a
line of cases stretching from Schmidt v. Merchants Desp. Transp. Co.,
[200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936)], to Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., [657 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1995)]."' The Blanco court did not ex-
plain why Consorti failed to recognize the applicability of N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 214-c.
The court's confusing opinion in Consorti llhas made it unclear
whether a spouse has the right to bring a loss of consortium claim
arising from a premarital, latent injury. The court held that the same
accrual standard should apply to the claims of both the injured and
deprived spouses." Unfortunately, the court proceeded to ignore the
discovery statute and mistakenly applied the time of exposure rule to
cussing repressed memory syndrome). As a result of this trauma, the plaintiff experienced ex-
treme mental and physical distress, including paranoia, nightmares, insomnia, headaches, and
appetite loss. See Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at 1051. Plaintiffs wife suffered loss of consortium
due to these injuries. See id. In recognizing her claim, the court held that since the discovery rule
was the proper standard for the underlying claim, it should also apply to the loss of consortium
claim. See id.
180. See Anderson I, 588 N.E.2d at 1302-03.
181. See id.; see also Snyder v. Town Insulation, 615 N.E.2d 999 (N.Y. 1993), called into
doubt by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (McKinney 1999) (passed in 1986); Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1981), superseded by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c; Thorton v. Roosevelt
Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1979), superseded by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c; Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1963), superseded by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c; Schmidt
v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936), superseded by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-
c).
182. See supra note 181.
183. See Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1303:
[Through] succeeding generations of Judges composing this Court, over some 60 years,
the Schmidt rule fixing the occurrence of tortious injury as the date when the toxic sub-
stance invades or is introduced into the body, has been reconsidered and reaffirmed, de-
spite importunings that adoption of a medical date-of-injury standard would achieve
more just results.
184. Blanco v. AT&T Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1997); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c.
185. See Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1302.
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the loss of consortium claim." Since the Court of Appeals has subse-
quently recognized the abrogation of the time of exposure rule in toxic
exposure cases,18 ' the court should apply the discovery rule to loss of
consortium claims stemming from premarital, latent toxic exposure
injuries.
The New York Court of Appeals has twice confronted the issue
of whether to recognize a loss of consortium claim arising from a pre-
marital, latent toxic exposure." Its first consideration of the issue in
Anderson H produced a precedent internally inconsistent, inconsistent
with prior law, inconsistent with the modern conception of loss of con-
sortium, and inconsistent with statutory authority. The court further
confused the jurisprudence by applying an accrual rule.9 that had pre-
viously been abrogated by statute. Nonetheless, the Consorti H court
applied the same accrual standard to the loss of consortium claim as it
would have applied to the underlying claim." While this was the cor-
rect method for analyzing the loss of consortium claim, the court mis-
takenly held that the time of exposure rule applied to the underlying
claim. Now that the court has recognized the applicability of the dis-
covery rule in the toxic exposure context, 9' the Consorti H reasoning
suggests that New York courts should apply the discovery rule to a
loss of consortium claim arising from premarital, latent toxic expo-
sure.
B. Iowa Courts
The Supreme Court of Iowa has addressed the issue of loss of
consortium claims based on latent, premarital injuries in three
cases, 9 ' all of which involved repressed memory syndrome stemming
from sexual abuse. In Doe v. Cherwitz, a patient and her husband
brought claims against a doctor who allegedly sexually assaulted her
during a pelvic examination.'93 She repressed this premarital incident
until after her wedding." Since the discovery rule applied to his wife's
claim, the husband argued that the discovery rule should also apply to
186. See id. at 1302-03.
187. See Blanco, 689 N.E.2d at 509.
188. See Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1301; Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co. ("Anderson IT), 588
N.E.2d 66, 67-68 (N.Y. 1991).
189. Anderson II, 588 N.E.2d at 67-68.
190. Consorti II, 657 N.E.2d at 1302-03.
191. See Blanco, 689 N.E.2d at 509.
192. See Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1995) (en banc); Claus v. Whyle, 526
N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1994); Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 1994).
193. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d at 362.
194. See id. at 365.
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his loss of consortium claim.'95 In rejecting this contention, the court
held:
The discovery rule anticipates that the claimant had a valid cause of action within the
period of limitations, but for some reason, was unaware of it. Here, because there was
no marital relation[ship] between [the couple], there was no cause of action within the
period of limitations, and the discovery rule cannot create one when none had ever ex-
isted during the period of limitations.
196
This holding demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
the discovery rule. The Cherwitz court envisioned the discovery rule as
only reviving a claim when the plaintiff did in fact have a cause of ac-
tion within the statutory period and the claim was, for some reason,
"unknown and basically unknowable" to the plaintiff during that
time "9 However, because of the latency period for some injuries, plain-
tiffs often do not have a cause of action within the statutory period,
yet courts nonetheless apply the discovery rule. The discovery rule
generally begins the running of the statute of limitations when a party
knew or should have known all the essential elements of the cause of
action.96 In some situations, such as those involving asbestos expo-
sure, an element of the cause of action, for example damages, is not
sustained within the statutory period. " The discovery rule thus allows
the claim of a plaintiff in a situation where the plaintiff did not have a
claim during the statute of limitations, suggesting that the Cherwitz
court failed to properly understand the discovery rule when it denied a
cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from latent, premarital
injuries.
The Cherwitz court failed to contemplate that a plaintiff could
use the discovery rule to bring a cause of action for injuries that did
not manifest during the statutory period. Use of the discovery rule is
not limited to situations where the rule can revive a preexisting cause
of action. The court's holding that "the discovery rule cannot create a
[cause of action] when none had ever existed during the period of limi-
tations" was thus fundamentally flawed. Given the basic concept of
tort law that a person must have sustained injuries before having a
valid cause of action, the discovery rule frequently "creates" a cause of
action when none had existed during the statutory period.' The
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Green v. A.P.C., 960 P.2d 912, 915 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
199. See, e.g., id. at 915.
200. Another flaw in the Cherwitz standard was that it did not completely bar the applica-
tion of the discovery rule to loss of consortium claims stemming from a premarital, latent injury.
The court only barred use of the discovery rule when the plaintiff had no marital relationship
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Cherwitz court failed to understand that the discovery rule could like-
wise "create" a cause of action for loss of consortium where none had
existed before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Later that same year, the Supreme Court of Iowa revisited the
Cherwitz standard. In Claus v. Whyle, the court faced a similar
issue." The Claus court quoted the Cherwitz language,"2 and although
the court did not clearly articulate the holding, it adhered to the tradi-
tional marriage requirement by requiring the deprived spouse to prove
marriage at the point of initial injury."
Less than one year later, the Supreme Court of Iowa again ad-
judicated a factually similar case with the same underlying issue.' In
Frideres v. Schiltz, the discussion did not include the flawed Cherwitz
within the period of limitations. See Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d at 365. Thus, under Cherwitz, it was
possible in some cases to bring a loss of consortium claim stemming from a premarital latent
tort, a result the court probably did not intend.
A hypothetical will illustrate this type of scenario. Assume the statutory period for bringing
a medical malpractice claim is three years. In Year 1, a woman undergoes an appendectomy.
During the operation, the surgeon negligently leaves a knife in her body. The next year, she
marries. In Year 3, she discovers her injury. Her husband suffers an ongoing loss of consortium
due to the surgeon's malpractice. In this scenario, the husband would have a valid loss of consor-
tium claim under the Cherwitz approach. He has the prerequisite marital relationship within
the statute of limitations.
Thus, the Cherwitz standard permits a loss of consortium claim depending on when the in-
jury manifests. If a spouse is unknowingly exposed to medical malpractice before marriage and
marries before the statute of limitations expires, the other spouse would be allowed to bring a
loss of consortium claim. However, this point is moot because the Supreme Court of Iowa subse-
quently refined and expanded this standard. See infra Part VI.B.
201. Claus v. Whyle, 526 N.W.2d 519, 527 (Iowa 1994) ("In Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362,
364-65 (Iowa 1994), we addressed the same issue presented here.').
This case was brought by Beverly Jo and Aaron Claus, the daughter of a sexually abusive fa-
ther, and her husband. See id. at 523. Although Beverly Jo had problems functioning sexually
during the couple's courtship, it was not until after their marriage that she realized the source of
her dysfunction. See id. at 522. Within a couple of years of her marriage, Beverly Jo began to
have flashbacks of the abuse. See id. Even if the court would have allowed Aaron to use the
discovery rule, it is arguable whether he would have succeeded on his claim. It would depend on
whether a court permitted a deprived spouse to use the discovery rule whenever it is available to
the underlying claim, or whether knowledge of injury at marriage would prevent a deprived
spouse's use of the discovery rule. This issue is not considered in this Note because, for purposes
of this Note, it is assumed that neither spouse was aware of the injury before marriage.
202. See id. at 527.
203. See id. The court held:
Aaron and Beverly Jo were not married until September 20, 1989, approximately two
years after [her father] 'actually' sexually abused Beverly Jo on November 7, 1987. With-
out a marital relationship on November 7, 1987, Aaron did not have a right to bring an
action for spousal consortium at that time. Accordingly, the discovery rule is inapplica-
ble.
Id.
204. See Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 262 (Iowa 1995) (en banc). The impaired
spouse in this case was sexually abused by her brother and physically abused by her father. See
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discovery rule analysis."°5 Instead, the court based its decision on the
implied holding from Claus: 'Without a marital relationship at the
time of [injury], a spouse has no right to bring a cause of action for loss
of consortium. Under these circumstances, the discovery rule is not
applicable.""°
The Supreme Court of Iowa's analysis has two important flaws.
First, the law developed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the
discovery rule.' The court's failure to recognize that the discovery
rule will permit a claim even though the person never had a cause of
action during the statutory period skewed its analysis. Second, like
New York, Iowa has failed to thoroughly examine the countervailing
reasons for allowing or not allowing the loss of consortium cause of
action in the latent injury context. This is necessary in determining
whether or not the tortfeasor owes a duty to the spouse of the victim of
a premarital, latent injury.
VII. CONCLUSION
The concerns that led to the traditional approach to loss of con-
sortium claims are not present in the premarital, latent injury con-
text. The traditional approach requiring marriage at the time of injury
developed to prevent persons from marrying an injured person for the
purpose of creating a loss of consortium claim. Courts adhered to the
traditional approach so that the recognition of a claim where the
plaintiff had assumed the risk would not extend liability to unlimited
proportions, unfairly burdening the tortfeasor.
Where the premarital injury is latent, these threats do not ex-
ist, for it is impossible to "marry a lawsuit," or assume a risk, where
the injury is unknown and unknowable at the time of the marriage.
Furthermore, application of the discovery rule to loss of consortium
claims stemming from latent, premarital injuries does not extend li-
ability beyond the traditional parties. The traditional approach deny-
ing this type of claim fails to consider that equitable principles and the
history of the cause of action suggest that courts should apply the dis-
covery rule in cases of premarital, latent injuries. The discovery rule is
available to rescue the underlying claim from the statute of limita-
tions; it likewise should be available to rescue a loss of consortium
205. See id at 268. Cherwitz was analyzed in adjudicating the underlying claim. See id. at
267-68.
206. Id. at 268.
207. See supra Part VI.B.
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claim from the traditional marriage requirement. Courts that have
disagreed with this reasoning have misunderstood both the modern
conception of loss of consortium and the discovery rule.
The same principles that led courts and legislatures to create
the discovery rule are the principles that justify application of the rule
to loss of consortium claims in the premarital, latent injury context.
Failure to apply the discovery rule to these claims is blind imitation of
the past resulting in denial of recovery to spouses who, through no
fault of their own, could not have discovered their claim until after the
wedding bells rang.
Paul Davis Fancher"
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